Oath Terms of Service | Oath Policies
SECTION. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of. It just states that the US Constitution is the highest law of the US. That state judges must uphold the Constitution even if state laws are in conflict. In this Commerce Clause case, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress's power to focused on the meaning of the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8 of the.
But in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall insisted that "should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal. Thus, the Court expanded Congress power over interstate commerce in a way that gave it power over the national economy. In the s, the Rehnquist Court treated these New Deal cases as the high water mark of congressional power.
In the cases of U. Lopez and U. Morrisonthe Court confined this regulatory authority to intrastate economic activity.
In addition, in a concurring opinion in Gonzales v.
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___ (2016)
RaichJustice Scalia maintained that, under Lopez, "Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce. Sebeliusina majority of the justices found that a mandate to compel a person to engage in the economic activity of buying health insurance was beyond the powers of Congress under both the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.
The dispute over the breadth of the meaning of "commerce" turns, in large part, on the purposes one attributes to the clause, and to the Constitution as a whole, and what one thinks is the relevance of such purposes to the meaning of the text.
At Philadelphia inthe Convention resolved that Congress could "legislate in all cases. Convention 21 Max Farrand ed. This was then translated by the Committee of Detail into the present enumeration of powers in Article I, Section 8, which was accepted as a functional equivalent by the Convention without much discussion. Proponents of an expansive reading claim that the power to regulate commerce should extend to any problem the states cannot separately solve. Those who support a narrower reading observe that the Constitution aims to constrain, as well as to empower, Congress, and the broadest reading of the Commerce power extends well beyond anything the framers imagined.
As the dissenters in the health care case observed, "Article I contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-a-national-problem power. For contrasting views of evidence on the original public meaning of the terms in the Commerce Clause, compare Randy E. Balkin, Living Originalism ; Randy E. Barnett As Professor Koppelman and my jointly-authored essay shows, abundant evidence—including what we know about slavery at the time of the Founding—tells us that the original meaning of the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to make regular, and even to prohibit, the trade, transportation or movement of persons and goods from one state to a foreign nation, to another state, or to an Indian tribe.
It did not originally include the power to regulate the economic activities, like manufacturing or agriculture, that produced the goods to be traded or transported. We should follow the original meaning of this provision for the same reason we limit California to the same number of Senators as Delaware, notwithstanding the vast disparity between their populations, or limit the president to a person who is at least thirty-five years old, though some who are younger than thirty-five might make excellent presidents.
Oath Terms of Service
A written constitution is the law that governs those who govern us. And those who govern us— whether the Congress, the president, or the courts—can no more properly change the law that governs them without going through the amendment process of Article V, than can the people can change the speed limits imposed on them without going through the legislative process.
But such an oath would be meaningless if it was merely promising to obey whatever meaning a government official later wants the Constitution to mean. I agree with Professor Koppelman that the Founders attempted to distinguish the problems that were best handled at the national level from those best handled by the states.
But they did so by drafting a specific list of such powers, rather than leave it to the national authority to decide the scope of its own power.
Where later developments justify adding to these national powers, such expansion is properly handled by an Article V constitutional amendment, as the Constitution was once amended to give Congress the power to prohibit the intrastate economic activity of producing and selling alcohol. See the Eighteenth Amendment.
Enforcing the original meaning of the Commerce Clause does not mean that other economic activities are free from any government regulation. It merely means that the power to regulate all intrastate economic activities resides with each of the fifty states.
Where national uniformity and coordination between states are desirable, these goals can be achieved by the Interstate Compacts Clause of Article I, Section 8, by which states may enter into agreements or compacts with another state or states, provided they have the consent of Congress. Many such compacts exist. Read the full discussion here. I identify some of the key advantages of decentralizing most law-making at the state level in my statement on Federalism. Here is a summary of my analysis there: Federalism Makes Regulatory Diversity Possible.
Given widespread disagreement about both economic and social policies, lodging this regulatory power in the states enables a diversity of approaches to develop.
Citizens of the American Constitution | Jack & Margy Flynn, [email protected]
When it comes to economic regulation, so long as they remain within the proper scope of their power to protect the rights, health and safety of the public, fifty states can experiment with different regimes of legal regulation so the results can be witnessed and judged rather than endlessly speculated about. Please carefully read Sections 1 through 13, Please read the Terms carefully, as they form the entire agreement between you and Oath.
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In the ordinary course Louisiana courts will not consider a challenge to a disproportionate sentence on collateral review; rather, as a general matter, it appears that prisoners must raise Eighth Amendment sentencing chal-lenges on direct review. When, for example, this Court held in Graham v. Montgomery then filed an application for a supervisory writ. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the application. The court relied on its earlier decision in State v. Tate, —, So. In addition, the Court directed the parties to address the following question: II The parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction to decide this case.
What does the supremacy clause mean?
To ensure this conclusion is correct, the Court appointed Richard D. Bernstein as amicus curiae to brief and argue the position that the Court lacks jurisdiction. He has ably discharged his assigned responsibilities. Amicus argues that a State is under no obligation to give a new rule of constitutional law retroactive effect in its own collateral review proceedings.
States may not disregard a controlling, constitutional command in their own courts. Under Teague, a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure does not apply, as a general matter, to convictions that were final when the new rule was announced. Teague recognized, however, two categories of rules that are not subject to its general retroactivity bar. First, courts must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law.
It is undisputed, then, that Teague requires the retroactive application of new substantive and watershed procedural rules in federal habeas proceedings. In addition, amicus directs us to Danforth v.
What does the supremacy clause mean? | Yahoo Answers
Amicus, however, reads too much into these statements. Neither Teague nor Danforth had reason to address whether States are required as a constitutional matter to give retroactive effect to new substantive or watershed procedural rules. Teague originated in a federal, not state, habeas proceeding; so it had no particular reason to discuss whether any part of its holding was required by the Constitution in addition to the federal habeas statute.
In this case, the Court must address part of the question left open in Danforth. The Court now holds that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect to that rule. That constitutional command is, like all federal law, binding on state courts. Teague adopted that reasoning.
United States, U. It follows that when a State enforces a proscription or penalty barred by the Constitution, the resulting conviction or sentence is, by definition, unlawful. Nor could the use of flawless sentencing procedures legitimate a punishment where the Constitution immunizes the defendant from the sentence imposed. By holding that new substantive rules are, indeed, retroactive, Teague continued a long tradition of giving retroactive effect to constitutional rights that go beyond procedural guarantees.
See Mackey, supra, at — opinion of Harlan, J. Since, in this situation, the State had no power to proscribe the conduct for which the petitioner was imprisoned, it could not constitutionally insist that he remain in jail. In Ex parte Siebold, U. Before Siebold, the law might have been thought to establish that so long as the conviction and sentence were imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction, no habeas relief could issue.
In Siebold, however, the petitioners attacked the judgments on the ground that they had been convicted under unconstitutional statutes. It is true, if no writ of error lies, the judgment may be final, in the sense that there may be no means of reversing it. As discussed, the Court has concluded that the same logic governs a challenge to a punishment that the Constitution deprives States of authority to impose.